by deejayoh » Wed Jun 27, 2007 12:05 pm
TJ, I think you will enjoy this one...
The two hedge funds at Bear Stearns that teetered on the edge of a meltdown were essentially betting that the downturn in the subprime mortgage-lending business wouldn't be as bad as many expected. A Bear Stearns research report on subprime, "Sell on the Rumor, Buy on the News," issued in February shows the bank's researchers were making the same argument.
When Bear issued the report, the ABX indexes tracking credit-default swaps linked to subprime mortgages were tumbling amid worries about rising defaults, risky mortgage loans held by HSBC Holdings and trouble at subprime lender New Century Financial, which eventually went bankrupt. Bear researchers argued that the market's negative reactions were overdone. "As we see it, there should be nothing that is surprising in these announcements for seasoned observers of the subprime" market, Bear's analysts wrote in the Feb. 12 report.
The firm also made optimistic assumptions about the direction of home prices. The Bear researchers used a "conservative" estimate of 0% home-price appreciation for 2007. But prices haven't cooperated. Today's Standard & Poor's Case/Shiller Home Price Index of home prices in 20 large U.S. cities dropped 2.1% in April from a year ago. Economists at Goldman Sachs said the drop is in line with their expectations for a 5% decline in 2007.
Bear's model led it to argue that the fair value of the BBB- tranche of the ABX index issued in the second half of 2006 is $90.14 — at the time, it was trading for $82.68, and it hit a low $62.16 this week, according to Markit Group, which manages the index. The firm also claimed that many of the underlying mortgages in the index would fare relatively well, saying the loans with the highest level of defaults were in "weak local economies." But bad news about the performance of a majority of the loans in the index has continued to hurt it. A Monday report on remittance data on the subprime loans tracked by the ABX indexes showed measures of delinquencies and foreclosures were up in May from the previous month across all series of the index, according to Bank of America.
At the end of the day, the Bear research indicated that a buyer of the BBB- tranche (which was a bet that it wouldn't keep declining) originated in the later half of 2006 would reap an annualized return of 12.92% over 10 years. With such tempting gains, it probably made sense to make highly leveraged bets the subprime market would stabilize. Unfortunately, the research didn't match up with reality.
Housing economist Thomas Lawler wrote a scathing review of the Bear research in a note earlier this week: "Not surprisingly, by using overly optimistic (and not market-based) home-price appreciation assumptions, and overly optimistic (and not market-based) assumptions about the future credit performance of loans, the 'researchers' found that the 'fair value' of subordinate subprime bonds, and indexes based on [credit default swaps] on these bonds, was a lot higher than current 'market' values! Needless to say, the analysis was pretty shoddy."
So was the performance of the Bear Stearns hedge funds.